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ABSTRACT  Cooperation  patterns  in  the  Council  of  Ministers  have  featured 
particular characteristics over the last decades. Seven years after the 2004 
round  of  enlargement,  it  is  time  to  readdress  the  question  whether  long-
standing cooperation patterns have endured and how the new members have 
fit in the existing structures. Following a comparative case study research 
design, the current article investigates four negotiations: the 7
th Framework 
Programme, the Services Directive, the Driving Licence Directive and the 
Working Time Directive. Having conducted 40 semi-structured interviews 
with  national  representatives  of  ten  Member  States  we  find  that  some 
cooperation patterns, such as the north-south divide, have persisted. More 
specifically, the results reveal that the overall pattern leans towards a centre-
periphery model with the northern Member States as the central actors.  
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Introduction 
The recent troubles in the Eurozone have brought some of the traditional political alliances in 
the EU back in the spotlight. The “Franco-German” engine made a remarkable appearance at 
Deauville i n  O c t o b e r  2 0 1 0  a t  a  t r i p a r t i t e  s u m m i t  b e t w e e n  F r a n c e ,  G e r m a n y  and  Russia. 
France and Germany announced their compromise on the Eurozone’s bail-out mechanism 
ahead  of  an  upcoming  European  Council  meeting. B e i n g  p r e s e n t e d  w i t h  a  fait  accompli 
situation  provoked  wide  discontent  among  Member  States  and  proposals  were  made  for 
alternative  cooperation  mechanism,  such  as  a  “vanguard  group”  of  the  six  largest  EU 
countries, as reported by Guy Dinmore in a Financial Times article on November 4, 2010. 
This  leads  us  to  wonder,  whether  this  historical  Franco-German  cooperation  pattern  has 
firmly  established  itself  after t h e  l a s t  r o u n d  o f  e n l a r g e m e n t  o r  i s  i t  o n l y  a  t e m p o r a r y  
appearance?  How  does  the  cooperation  of  the  two  countries  fit  in  the  larger  patterns  of 
cooperation between the Member States and how have these patterns changed during the 
years after the enlargement?     
   Cooperation patterns in the Council of Ministers have attracted some scholarly attention. 
However,  this  particular  body  of  literature  has  remained  rather  controversial  in  terms  of 
findings. Studies (Beyers and Dierickx 1998; Elgström et al. 2001; Kaeding and Selck 2005) 
have demonstrated either a north-south divide among the EU Members States (Elgström et al. 
2001; Kaeding and Selck 2005) or a roughly matching “centre-periphery” pattern (Beyers and 
Dierickx  1998).  In  addition,  Selck  and  Kaeding  (2004)  investigated  the  Franco-German 
partnership and found evidence for the historical Franco-German partnership having lost its 
momentum, giving way to a “north-south” pattern.  
   Studies conducted after the enlargement of 2004 have given conflicting results on the nature 
of the patterns. Naurin and Lindhal (2008) presented evidence for a persisting north-south 
pattern joined by an eastern group. Mattila (2008), studying voting patterns, demonstrates that 
north-south remains the most visible conflict dimension in the enlarged union. Hagemann and 
De  Clerck-Sachsse  (2007)  found n o  s u b s t a n t i a l  e v i d e n c e  o f  v i s i b l e  geographical  patterns. 
However,  Hagemann  (2008)  shows  some  weak  evidence  for  geographical  clustering. 3 
Thomson (2009) demonstrated consistent patterns in actor alignments to be relatively rare and 
a new-old alignment to appear mostly in issues concerning financial subsidies. 
   The aim of our research is to see whether recent developments in the EU have brought any 
changes  to  the  existing  cooperation  patterns  across  Member  States  in  the  Council  of  the 
European Union. Is there any proof of the perseverance of the north-south divide or do we see 
the old Member States joining their forces vis-à-vis the new Member States? What effect has 
the 2004 enlargement had on the “locked-in” cooperation patterns in the daily business of 
Council working groups more generally and the Franco-German partnership in particular?  
   We will address this question as follows. Firstly, we assess earlier research in the field and 
outline  the  research  design.  Secondly,  we  assess  if,  and  to  what  extent  there  have  been 
changes  to  the  north-south  divide  which  has  been  the  underlying  pattern  in  European 
integration for many years.  Finally, we provide a summary of the findings and conclude with 
suggestions for future research. 
 
Literature review 
Cooperation patterns in the Council have not been subject to extensive research, as to this date 
only  a  few m a j o r  s t u d i e s  h a v e  b e e n  c o n d u c t e d  i n  t h e  f i e l d .  B e y e r s  a n d  D i e r i c k x  ( 1 9 9 8 )  
studied the communication patterns in the EU, Elgström et al. (2001) conducted a research on 
the Swedish officials’ cooperation networks, Mattila and Lane (2001) and Kaeding and Selck 
(2005)  mapped  the  coalition  patterns  in  the  Council.  Hagemann  and D e  C l e r c k -Sachsse 
(2007), Hagemann (2008) and Mattila (2008) took a look at the voting patterns in the Council 
and Naurin (2007) investigated the cooperation patterns in the working groups of the Council 
of the EU. Thomson (2009) analysed actor alignments on legislative proposals.   
 
Before the 2004 enlargement 
The four major studies which were conducted before the enlargement of the Union in 2004 
were based on data of the EU-12 or EU-15. The extensive data-sets were analysed using 
quantitative methods and all of them confirmed the existence of a north-south – or in the case 4 
of  Beyers  and  Dierickx  (1998)  a  north-centre-periphery  – d i v i d e .  H o w e v e r ,  e a c h  o f  t h e  
studies  had  a  slightly a n g l e ,  focussing  either  on  cooperation,  communication  or  coalition 
patterns.  
   Beyers and Dierickx’s study “The Working Groups of the Council of the European Union” 
addressed the communication patterns in the European Union of 12 Member States (Beyers 
and Dierickx 1998). 117 national representatives from a selection of 13 working groups were 
interviewed about their communication patterns during the Belgian Presidency of 1993. The 
data was analysed using principal component analysis. As the main finding, three groups 
emerged from the dataset – periphery, centre and north, whereas no significant differences 
emerged between policy domains.  
   Elgström et al. analysed Swedish officials’ cooperation patterns in their article “Coalitions 
in  European  Union  Negotiations”. Their research concentrated on expert groups, working 
groups and comitology committees in the EU-15, with questionnaires being answered by 275 
Swedish civil servants (Elgström et al. 2001). Using simple percentage calculating to process 
the data they discovered a north-south divide in the cooperation patterns of the officials (ibid, 
pp. 121-122), supposedly based on policy interests and/or cultural affinity (ibid, p. 111).  
   Other scholars analysed the coalition patterns in the Council of Ministers during the time 
period of 1995-2000. Mattila and Lane (2001) used voting data while the research of Kaeding 
and Selck (2005) covered 174 policy issues for 70 legislative proposals and interviewed 125 
persons involved in the negotiations. Using principal component analysis to process the data 
Kaeding and Selck (2005) were able to establish a north-south divide among the Member 
States’  voting  patterns  (Kaeding  and  Selck  2005,  p.  271)  with  France  belonging  to  the 
southern group (ibid, p. 281).Using the same dataset, Selck and Kaeding (2004, p. 92) also 
concluded that the importance of the historical Franco-German partnership has diminished 
and given way to a north-south coalition pattern.  
 
 
 5 
After the 2004 enlargement 
Four more recent studies give conflicting results on the impact of the 2004 enlargement. 
Some suggest that no strict geographical patterns can be seen, even though the data give hints 
for some clusters (Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse 2007, Hagemann 2008). Others claims 
that the north-south pattern continues to exist (Naurin 2007; Mattila 2008). However, it has to 
be taken into account that the studies approached the matter differently. Hagemann and De 
Clerck-Sachsse  (2007),  Hagemann  (2008)  and  Mattila  (2008)  concentrated o n  c o a l i t i o n  
patterns in the Council while the focal points of Naurin (2007) were cooperation patterns in 
the Council working groups.   
   Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse (2007) analysed the decision-making in the Council and 
the impact of the 2004 enlargement on it in the period 2001 – 2006.  Their data was based on 
52  interviews  with  officials  of  the  EU  institutions,  the  permanent  representations  of  the 
Member States to the EU and external policy experts. Using a geometrical scaling method 
NOMINATE for analysing the data Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse concluded that “no 
strict north-south division” is apparent and that the new Member States have not been acting 
as a distinct bloc. However, “a few geographical clusters” such as the Nordic countries and 
the Central and Southern European countries emerged on a general level (Hagemann and De 
Clerck-Sachsse 2007, p. 23). Mattila (2008, p. 35), analysing changes in coalition patterns, 
concluded  that  there  has  been  no  significant  change  to  the  voting  patterns  after  the 
enlargement. 
   Naurin (2007) studied both the Member States’ network capital as well as the cooperation 
patterns in the Council. The data was collected by 361 telephone interviews carried out with 
the representatives of all the Member States in 11 Council working groups in 2003 and 2006. 
Using  multidimensional  scaling  it  was  concluded  (Naurin  2007,  p.  14)  that  “cooperation 
patterns  in  the  Council  working  groups  follow  geographical  patterns”.  According  to  the 
research, the EU-15 had two “cores”— the north and the south, with Germany being in the 
middle. The 2004 enlargement did not change this pattern but added countries to both camps 6 
(ibid, p. 20). Using the same data, Naurin and Lindahl (2008, p. 75) also claim the existence 
of a separate eastern group, in addition to the previously mentioned north and south.  
   This study takes up the scholarly call and tests the longstanding but controversial north-
south argument: cooperation in the Council of Ministers is characterised by a north-south 
divide.  Through  four  case  studies,  this  paper  will  investigate  whether t h i s  a r g u m e n t  h a s  
prevailed seven years after the 2004 round of enlargement, and whether a new “eastern” 
dimension has emerged. 
 
Research design 
For the purposes of testing the controversial argument of a north-south divide empirically, we 
define cooperation as a process of consultation and exchange of information between the 
Member States outside the official meetings of Council working groups.  In order to map the 
Member States’ cooperation patterns, we conducted a comparative case study on four issues: 
the  7
th F r a m e w o r k  P r o g r a m m e ,  S e r v i c e s  D i r e c t i v e ,  D r i v i n g  L i c e n c e  D i r e c t i v e ,  a n d  t h e  
Working Time Directive. We conducted interviews with a total of 40 representatives, four 
representatives from ten Member States, each of whom had been working with one of the 
cases.  
 
Selection of the four cases: 
The cases of the study were chosen according to the general assumption that the EU’s policies 
can in broad terms be divided into regulatory and distributive matters. In order to isolate the 
“poor vs. rich” or “net beneficent vs. net contributor” pattern (Mattila 2004; Zimmer et al. 
2005) two of the chosen cases are of a regulatory (Services Directive and Driving Licence 
Directive) and two of a distributive nature (7
th Framework Programme and Working Time 
Directive). Furthermore, the cases represent different policy areas: research, social policy, 
transport and the internal market. A significant criterion for the choice of cases was also the 
time period in which they were negotiated – the bulk of the four negotiation processes took 
place after the 2004 enlargement.  7 
 
Selection of Member States 
Ten countries – the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom – were chosen for the study bearing in mind the 
equal representation of the main geographical units: the north, the south, and the east (the new 
Member  States).  Each  of  the  geographical  groups  comprises  at  least  one  larger  and  one 
smaller Member State in order to control for a “large vs. small” bias (Hosli 1999; Raunio and 
Wiberg 1998) interfering with other types of patterns.  
 
Data from semi-structured interviews 
The  data  on  cooperation  patterns  was  gathered  by  interviews,  which  were  conducted  in 
Brussels either face-to-face or by telephone. The representatives received the questionnaires 
in advance to allow for preparation in advance. Prior to the interview the respondents were 
asked to fill in two tables regarding their cooperation partners.  First, they had to evaluate on a 
five-point scale (Very often, Often, Sometimes, Rarely, Never) how frequently they contacted 
their  cooperation  partners  outside  the  official  committee  meetings.  Secondly,  they  had t o  
indicate how often they were contacted by the representatives of the ten countries outside the 
official committee meetings. The two tables served as the primary source for gathering data 
on the cooperation networks, while additional questions were posed during the interviews to 
shed light on the underlying reasons as well as the possible particularities of the specific case. 
 
Results 
 
The 7
th Framework Programme: a classic old-new divide 
 
Research  is  an  essential  part  of  the  European  Union’s  pursuit  in  becoming  the  most 
competitive knowledge-based economy in the world. It is an important component of the 
Lisbon  agenda’s  triangle  alongside  with  education  and  innovation.  The  7
th F r a m e w o r k  
Programme is aimed to answer the European research policy needs by providing a better 8 
regulatory framework as well as more financial resources. The Framework Programme is 
divided into four specific programmes, each one of which is aimed to improve a different 
aspect of research policy. It has a budget of 70 billion euros, which made the programme an 
important redistributive issue and was likely to create diverging opinions among Member 
States regarding the allocation of funds. (European Commission SCADPlus 2007a) 
   The  7
th F r a m e w o r k  P r ogramme  presented  a  complex  set  of  issues  to  negotiate,  with 
different  sub-programmes  and  sub-questions  to  be  forged  out  in  the  Council  and  in  the 
European Parliament. It is no surprise that the procedure for adopting the programme lasted 
more than one and a half years, from April 2005 till December 2006 (European Commission 
PreLex  2007),  stretching  over  the  Council  Presidencies  of  Luxemburg,  United  Kingdom, 
Austria, and Finland.  
   With  regard  to  the  cooperation  patterns  around  the  negotiations  of  the  7
th F r a m e w o r k  
Programme the following aspects could be found (see Table 1). Firstly, the old Member States 
from both the north and the south tended to cooperate more with each other than with the new 
Member States, Sweden being the only country in the northern group that mentioned frequent 
contacts with the new Member States. Within the southern group, the two countries with the 
least partners among the new Member States were Spain and Greece. Interestingly, no new 
Member States were included in the core networks of the largest Member States – Germany, 
France or the UK’s.  
   Secondly, the new Member States tended to cooperate more with each other than with the 
old  Member  States.  The  old  Member  States  from  the  north  with  whom  they  had  close 
connections  were,  with  a  few  exceptions,  either  neighbouring  states  (also  including  the 
“overseas” neighbours, such as Finland and Sweden for Estonia) or countries holding the 
Presidency.  For  example,  during  their  respective  presidencies,  Austria  and  Finland  were 
among the countries most often contacted by the new Member States.   
   At first glance no north-south pattern becomes evident. Rather, there seems to be an old vs. 
new member state divide wherein both the old and the new Member States cooperate more 
within their own group respectively, and the old ones have only scarce contacts, if any, with 9 
the  newcomers  Member  States.  Nevertheless,  the  cooperation  patterns  of  the  four  new 
Member  States  show  more  cooperation  with  the  northern  group  than  with  the  southern 
countries.  
Table 1. Member States’ cooperation partners in the 7
th Framework Programme negotiations 
    New Member States    North    South 
    CZ  EE  HU  PL    DE  SE  UK    FR  EL  ES 
Cyprus                      X   
Czech Republic      x        x          x 
Estonia              x           
Hungary              x           
Latvia  x  X                     
Lithuania  x  X    X                 
Malta    X    X                 
Poland      X                  x 
Slovakia  X    x  X                 
N
e
w
 
M
e
m
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e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
Slovenia  X      X              X   
                           
Austria*  x    x  X        X      X   
Belgium                x        x 
Denmark              X           
Finland*  x  X    x    x  X  X        x 
Germany      X  x      X  x    x    x 
Irish Republic  x            x  X        x 
Luxembourg*        x        X         
Netherlands  x    x      x  x  X        x 
Sweden  X  X        x    X        X 
N
o
r
t
h
 
United 
Kingdom*  x    X      x  x      x    X 
                           
Greece                        x 
France  X    X      X  X  x        X 
Italy        x        x    x  X  X 
Portugal              x        X  X 
S
o
u
t
h
 
Spain      X        x      x  X   
 
Notes: * marks countries who held the Council Presidency during the negotiations; X – countries 
contacted “very often”; x – countries contacted “often”. 
 
The Services Directive – a classic north-south divide 
 
The Services Directive marks an important milestone in completing the internal market by 
providing an improved environment for the free movement of services. The main objectives 
of  the  Services  Directive  were  to  “ease  freedom  of  establishment  for  providers  and  the 
freedom  of  provision  of  services  in  the  EU”,  to  strengthen  “the  rights  of  recipients  of 10 
services”,  “to  promote  the  quality  of  services”,  and  “to  establish  effective  administrative 
cooperation among the Member States” (European Commission SCADPlus 2007b).  As a 
politically sensitive and controversial issue, it took almost two years to forge it out in the 
different institutions. 
   Due to the high level of politicisation of the directive, not much leeway was left for the 
representatives  in  defining  their  positions  and  the  margins  for  negotiating.  This  is  also 
apparent  in  their  cooperation  patterns  as  the  rationale  behind  forming  the  cooperation 
networks  – a s  m e n t i o n e d  b y  a l l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n t e r v i e w e d  – w a s  t h e  c o m m o n a l i t y  o f  
positions, while personal relations and cultural factors allegedly played a less significant role.    
   Three groups of states clearly emerge from the selection, their differences being mainly 
ideological. The groups are as follows: the liberals, the less-liberals and the “ones in between” 
(i.e. countries with mixed positions, combining elements from both of the major camps; for 
the full picture, see Table 2). To the first group belong the majority of the new Member States 
– the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia –   
and some of the old Member States: Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK.  
   The less-liberal group was mainly composed of old Member States – Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, France and Portugal – but also two new Member States Cyprus and Malta. 
The “in-between” group included Denmark, Sweden, Italy and Spain. The first two groups 
were  quite  clearly  distinguishable  from  each  other  with  no  frequent  contact  apart  from 
occasional cooperation, such as between the UK and France, Greece and Ireland. Meanwhile, 
both  of  the  abovementioned  groups  cooperated  with  the  “in-between”  countries  and  vice 
versa. 
   The data suggests that the political cleavage runs to a great ext ent  al ong a nor t h-south 
divide.  According  to  the  northern  group’s  and  the  new  Member  States’  responses,  the 
southern states hardly ever cooperated with countries outside their own group, France being 
the  only  exception.  Nevertheless,  the  southern  Member  States’  patterns  include  some 
countries from the other groups, somewhat tempering the argument for a sharp north-south 11 
division. Also, it is important to point out that some of the geographically northern states like 
Sweden, Denmark and Belgium did not belong to the liberal camp.  
Table 2. Member States’ cooperation partners in the Services Directive negotiations 
    New Member States    North    South 
    CZ  EE  HU  PL    DE  SE  UK    FR  EL  ES 
Cyprus                         
Czech Republic    x  x  X        X        x 
Estonia        X      x  x        x 
Hungary    x    X                x 
Latvia  x  x    x      x          x 
Lithuania  x  x    X      x          x 
Malta                      X   
Poland    x  X          x        X 
Slovakia  x  x    X        x        x 
N
e
w
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
Slovenia  x  x    x        x        x 
                           
Austria*  x    x      x  x  X         
Belgium                      X  x 
Denmark              x          x 
Finland*  x  x          x  X        x 
Germany      X  x            X     
Irish Republic  X  x  X  x        X      X  x 
Luxembourg*  X  x          x  X        X 
Netherlands  X  x  X  x        X        X 
Sweden  X                    X  x 
N
o
r
t
h
 
United 
Kingdom*  X  x  X  X    X  x      x    X 
                           
Greece                         
France  x    X      X    x      X   
Italy    x                X  x  x 
Portugal                    x  X   
S
o
u
t
h
 
Spain      x              x     
 
Notes: * marks countries who held the Council Presidency during the negotiations; X – countries 
contacted “very often”; x – countries contacted “often”. 
 
 
 
   Regarding the plausibility of old vs. new member state divide it is apparent that both the 
liberal and the less-liberal groups included both old and new Member States. Interestingly, 
however, the only new Member States in the less-liberal camp were Malta and Cyprus. This 
leads to suggest that in the area of the free movement of services, there is a strong distinction 
between the southern new members and the northern new members, reinforcing the overall 12 
north-south argument. All-in-all, the Services Directive reveals a clear-cut ideological divide 
between the northern and the southern Member States.  
 
Driving Licence Directive revisited – centre-periphery divide 
The  Driving  Licence  Directive  recasts  the  existing  2003  legislation,  harmonising  the 
conditions for issuing national driving licences. The Directive’s aim is to enable reciprocal 
recognition of licences and thus make it easier for people to travel within the Union or to 
settle in a Member State other than the one in which they have obtained their driving licence. 
(European Commission SCADPlus 2007c)  
   In particular, the Directive introduced substantive changes, in order to achieve the following 
aims. Firstly, to reduce the possibilities for fraud by replacing the paper driving licence with a 
plastic card. Secondly, to ensure the free movement of people by stipulating that all licences 
will have the same period of validity and will be valid in all Member States, unconditionally, 
for the same administrative period. Thirdly, in order to improve road safety, the Directive 
introduces a new category of licence for mopeds and harmonises the frequency of medical 
checks  for  professional  drivers.  (European  Commission  SCADPlus 2 0 0 7 c ) 13 
 
Table 3. Member States’ cooperation partners in the Driving Licence Directive negotiations 
    New Member States    North    South 
    CZ  EE  HU  PL    DE  SE  UK    FR  EL  ES 
Cyprus                      X   
Czech Republic      x  x    x        x     
Estonia                         
Hungary  X      X    x    x    x     
Latvia    X                     
Lithuania    X                     
Malta                x    x  x   
Poland  X    X      x    x        x 
Slovakia        x    x    x         
N
e
w
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
Slovenia            x             
                           
Austria*  x    X  X    X  x  X    x    x 
Belgium      x  x    X        X     
Denmark            x  X      x     
Finland*  x          x  X  X         
Germany  x  X  X  x      X  X    X  x   
Irish Republic*  x  x  x  x    X  x  X        x 
Luxembourg*        x    X        X  x  x 
Netherlands*  x  x  x  x    X  x      x    x 
Sweden            x             
N
o
r
t
h
 
United 
Kingdom*  x  x  x      X  x        x  x 
                           
Greece            x        x     
France  x          X          x  X 
Italy*  x          x        X  x  x 
Portugal                        X 
S
o
u
t
h
 
Spain            x        X  x   
 
Notes: * marks countries who held the Council Presidency during the negotiations; X – countries 
contacted “very often”; x – countries contacted “often”. 
 
 
 
 
   With  regard  to  the  cooperation  patterns,  it  is  apparent  that  the  new  Member  States 
cooperated most with the countries belonging to the northern group. The number of countries 
within their own group whom they contacted “very often” or “often” was almost two times 
smaller and only two countries from the southern group were contacted often.  14 
   The northern group’s cooperation pattern is surprisingly similar to that of the new Member 
States’: most of their partners belonged to the same, northern group, followed by the new 
Member  States.  No  significant  north-south  cooperation  could  be  observed  for  all  of  the 
northern countries. Neither the Swedish nor the UK representative mentioned the southern 
countries  as  important  partners,  only  Germany  considered  the  majority  of  the  southern 
countries important actors in its cooperation network.  
   The southern countries’ pattern mirrors that of the new Member States. They cooperated 
intensely with other southern countries and the northern Member States, whereas contacts 
with the new Member States were scarce. 
   Hence, in the case of the Driving License Directive we can clearly see the emergence of the 
centre-periphery pattern. Both the new Member States and the southern countries cooperated 
with states within their own group and with the northern group, but there was no significant 
connection between the new Member States and the south. Meanwhile, the northern group 
found  its  main  cooperation  partners  among  other  northern  states  while  not  cooperating 
significantly with neither the southern group or with the new Member States.  
 
Working Time Directive – “too early to call” 
 
The Directive lays down minimum general safety and health requirements for the organisation 
of working time. It regulates the periods of daily rest, breaks, weekly rest, annual leave and 
aspects  of  night  work  and  shift  work.  Sectoral  provisions  have  been  developed  for  road 
transport, work at sea and civil aviation. (European Commission SCADPlus 2007d) 
   The directive defines working time as “the period during which the worker is working, at 
the employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties, in accordance with national 
laws and/or practice”. Member States adopt the necessary measures to ensure every worker a 
minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours per 24-hour period, a rest break, where the 
working day is longer than six hours and a minimum uninterrupted rest period of 24 hours for 
each seven-day period, which is added to the 11 hours’ daily rest. Also, the directive limits 15 
the maximum weekly working time, including overtime, to 48 hours and grants employees the 
right for a paid annual leave of at least four weeks. (European Commission SCADPlus 2007d) 
   In  the  case  of  the  Working  Time  Directive
1,  the  new  Member  States  cooperated  most 
intensely with the other new Member States, followed by countries from the northern group. 
Cooperation with the southern countries was not as active as only France stood out as an 
important  partner  for  all  the  four  representatives  of  the  new  Member  States  interviewed.  
Also,  it  was  apparent  that  countries  holding  the  Presidency  (e.g.  the  Czech  Republic, 
Slovenia, Austria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, France) were indicated more often as 
important partners than the rest of the countries.  
   Countries belonging to the northern group had as many contacts with the representatives of 
countries from their own group as from the southern group and the new Member States. 
Curiously, Cyprus, Malta, Italy and Greece were left out from the northern group’s pattern, 
suggesting a bias towards a north-south divide. The southern group, however, cooperated 
equally often with countries from their own group as with the northern group and the new 
Member States. The importance of the new Member States in the southern countries’ pattern 
was roughly equal to the other southern countries. 
   The overall image suggests a centre-periphery pattern. The new Member States and the 
southern group cooperated the most with countries belonging to their own group and with the 
northern  countries.  Meanwhile,  the  northern  countries  themselves  cooperated  first  and 
foremost with other countries in their own group, followed by the new Member States. The 
southern countries, however, cooperated slightly more with the northern group than with the 
new Member States or the other southern countries. 
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Table 4. Member States’ cooperation partners in the Working Time Directive negotiations 
    New Member States    North    South 
    CZ  EE  HU  PL    DE  SE  UK    FR  EL  ES 
Cyprus                    x     
Czech 
Republic*    x  x  x    x  x  x    x  x  x 
Estonia  x    x  x    x    x         
Hungary  X  x    x    x  x  X    X    x 
Latvia    X    x    x    x         
Lithuania  x  X    x    x    x         
Malta                x         
Poland  x  X  X      x  x  X    x    x 
Slovakia  X  x  x  x    x    x         
N
e
w
 
M
e
m
b
e
r
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
Slovenia*  x  x    x    x  x  x    x  x  x 
                           
Austria*  x  x  x  x    x  x  x    x  x  x 
Belgium      X      x  x      x     
Denmark            x  x  x    x     
Finland*  x  x  x      x  x  x    x  x  x 
Germany*  x  x  x  X      x  X    X  x  x 
Irish Republic*              x  x         
Luxembourg*      x  x    X  x  x    x     
Netherlands*  x  x  x  x    x  x  x    x  x  x 
Sweden            x    x         
N
o
r
t
h
 
United 
Kingdom*  x    x      X  x      X    x 
                           
Greece                         
France*  x  x  X  X    X  x  X      x  X 
Italy                    x  x  x 
Portugal*  x      x    x  x  x      x  x 
S
o
u
t
h
 
Spain      X      x        x  x   
 
Notes: * marks countries who held the Council Presidency during the negotiations; X – countries 
contacted “very often”; x – countries contacted “often”. 
 
Discussion 
In this chapter we look at all the four cases together, firstly to check if we can find regularities 
across the cases. Secondly to see, how our data compares with the existing body of literature 
on  cooperation  patterns.  Thirdly  we  discuss  if  there  is  evidence  for  a  “Franco-German 
engine”.
2 
 
Comparing countries’ patterns across the four cases 17 
In order to see the overall image we placed all of the data from the four cases into one table in 
hope that this would help us overcome the issue/policy specific patterns to some extent and 
arrive at conclusions of a more general level. Firstly, we looked at the overall spread of the 
data points (i.e. countries contacted “often” or “very often”) and secondly, we checked for 
matches in the countries’ data points across the cases. 
   Looking at all of the Member States that were pointed out by the representatives as having 
been  contacted  “often”  or  “very  often”  in  the  four  cases,  we  find  evidence  for  a  centre-
periphery pattern. Out of the total number of 420 data points, countries belonging to the 
northern group were mentioned 209 times (see Table 5), the new Member States 141 times 
and the southern states 70 times. Each of the three groups had the most contacts with the 
northern group. Curiously, regarding the southern group, there was only a small difference 
between the number of times the southern countries had mentioned the new Member States 
and the other countries. However, to a certain extent this can be explained by the fact that in 
our dataset Cyprus and Malta are placed among the new Member States. Treating them as 
southern states would give the southern group more weight. Admittedly, we also have to take 
into account that the new Member States were slightly overrepresented in our data-set – they 
were represented by four countries, while there were only three countries from both the north 
and the south. 
Table 5. Count of Member States contacted “often” or “very often” 
                                           New Member States              North                South             Total 
                                            (CZ, EE, HU, PL)      (DE, SE, UK)    (EL, ES, FR)  
 
New Member States                   68      43    30         141 
North            80      75    54         209 
South            17      19    34           70 
 
 
Notes: The table shows the number of times the interviewees mentioned having cooperated with the 
other Member States. The horizontal row indicates the countries interviewed, while the vertical row 
shows all Member States. For example, the representatives of the four new Member States mentioned 
the other new Member States as important partners 68 times, countries from the northern group 80 and 
the southern group 17 times. 
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   To compare the individual countries’ cooperation patterns we placed the data of the four 
cases of one country next to each other and assessed to what extent they match. Highlighting 
the cases where at least three representatives of one member state had mentioned the same 
Member States as their important partner, the same centre-periphery pattern appears as in the 
overall  picture  - t h e  N o r t h  i s  i n  t h e  c e n t r e  a n d  n o t  m a n y  l i n k a g e s  e m e r g e  b e t w e e n  t h e  
peripheral groups. Interestingly, the main part of the southern states’ “core network” lies 
within their own group. We can also see that, with a few exceptions, the main partners of a 
member  state  tend  to  be  either  countries  from  the  same  geographical  area  or  influential 
Member States, such as large Member States or the Presidencies.  
   The main observation that can be made looking at the individual pattern of countries is that 
the countries in the northern group tend to focus mostly on their own group whereas both the 
new Member States and the southern countries are looking for cooperation both within their 
own group as well as with the northern group. The contacts between the new Member States 
and the southern countries are scarce. Not surprisingly, France proves an exception to the 
described pattern as a country with which both groups often seek contact. All in all, this 
provides evidence for a core-periphery pattern. 19 
 
Comparison with earlier research 
As  indicated  above,  previous  research  has  demonstrated  the  existence  of  a  north-south 
cooperation pattern in EU decision-making. Taking into account the countries’ individual 
cooperation patterns and especially the matches between the four cases we only find weak 
evidence to support the north-south pattern in the cases of the 7
th Framework Programme, the 
Driving Licence Directive and the Working Time Directive, but some confirming evidence in 
the case of the Services Directive.  
   It is evident that both the southern countries and the new Member States communicate often 
with countries from the northern group. The northern group countries themselves focus on 
cooperation  within  their  group  and  a  relatively  small  number  of  contacts  occur  with  the 
countries outside the northern group.  Their most important partner in the southern group is 
France, which accounts for the bulk of the contacts. The northern groups’ contacts with the 
new Member States are more diverse and the relative frequency of contact is also slightly 
higher than with the south.    
   Concerning the core partners, a north-south divide can be reconfirmed to a certain extent but 
a  core-periphery  pattern  is  more  evident. T h e  n e w  M e m b e r  S t a t e s  h a v e  e v e n  m o r e  
cooperation partners in the northern group than within their own group. The same applies to 
the southern Member States (mainly because of the extended cooperation pattern of Spain) 
while the northern states cooperate first and foremost with other countries in their group. We 
can therefore suggest that there is more evidence for a centre-periphery pattern (Beyers and 
Dierickx, 1998) than for alternative patterns.  
 
The “Franco-German engine” 
The continuing existence of the Franco-German partnership (Wood, 1995; Pedersen, 1998; 
Selck  and  Kaeding,  2004) c a n  o n l y  b e  p r o v e n  h a l f w a y .  W e  c o u l d  s e e  t h e  t w o  c o u n t r i e s 
cooperating  systematically  with  each  other  but  we  did  not  find  evidence  for  them  being 
central for other Member States’ cooperation networks.  20 
 
   France and Germany stood out in our data-set as the only pair of states which had frequent 
mutual contacts with each other in all of the four cases. Remarkably, in all cases but one they 
stated that contacts took place “very often”. This indicates that the Franco-German tandem 
works – both states see each other as essential partners across different issues.  
   Placing this partnership in the overall pattern we can see that both France and Germany 
were  mentioned  as  important  partners  by  all  the  representatives  only  in  the  case  of  the 
Working Time Directive. Germany was also mentioned as an important partner by almost all 
of the representatives interviewed in the case of the Driving Licence Directive but neither of 
the two countries played an outstanding role in the 7
th Framework Programme or the Services 
Directive. It is nevertheless important to note that usually the countries mentioned most often 
were the ones holding the Presidency, which was not the case for either Germany or France.  
   Not surprisingly, Germany carries more weight in the perception of the new Member States 
and France is regarded as an important partner by the southern countries. In the eyes of the 
northern group their position is roughly equal.  
   Our findings suggest that while neither Germany nor France appears to be the sole leader 
within the union, they both exercise significant influence i n t hei r  r es pect i ve geogr aphi cal  
areas. Working together in a tandem they can form a formidable team as long as they pursue 
the same interests.  
 
Conclusion 
Seven years after the 2004 round of enlargement of the European Union, this contribution 
revisits the cooperation patterns in the Council to see how the accession of ten new Member 
States has changed the situation. Data on the Services Directive, the Working Time Directive, 
the Driving Licence Directive and the 7
th Framework Programme for Research show that 
cooperation  patterns  have  changed  over  the  last  years f r o m  a  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  n o r t h -south 
divide towards a stronger centre-periphery pattern.  21 
 
   Each of the abovementioned four cases demonstrated a different pattern. In the case of the 
7
th Framework Programme, we could see an old-new divide as the northern states themselves 
were more inclined towards the south, whereas both the new Member States and the south 
sought cooperation with the northern group. In the case of the Services Directive the divide is 
clearly of ideological nature, following to a certain extent the north-south line. The cases of 
the Working Time Directive and Driving Licence Directive demonstrate a centre-periphery 
pattern where both the new Member States and the southern group seek to cooperate with the 
north, while the countries of the northern group focus primarily on cooperation within their 
own group.  
   Hence the continued existence of the north-south divide after the 2004 enlargement can only 
be confirmed half-way. The countries in the northern group tend to cooperate mainly with 
other northern countries and slightly more with new Member States than with the southern 
countries. The new Member States cooperate as much with the northern group than with their 
own group (and less so with the southern countries) whereas the southern group is inclined to 
collaborate the most with the northern group. This suggests a centre-periphery pattern with 
the northern group as the central actor. 
    With regard to our second research question, whether the “Franco-German engine” still 
plays a role after the 2004 enlargement, our data show strong cooperation between the two 
countries.  However,  they  both  tend  to  have  more  influence  in  their  respective  regions  – 
France in the south and Germany in the north and among the new Member States.  
   It can also be concluded that the main cooperation partners in the four cases were likely to 
be either neighbours or key actors such as the largest Member States or the countries holding 
the Presidency. This characteristic should deserve further scholarly attention in the future 
(Tallberg 2004; Thomson 2008; Warntjen 2008). Considering the clear “Northern” bias in EU 
presidencies over the last years
3 we are in need of longitudinal research designs to check 
whether we witness different “waves of cooperation patterns” in the Council.   
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Notes 
1.  Please note that the Directive was eventually not adopted by the co-legislators. The Conciliation     
Committee was unable to find a compromise text, which was to be put forward to the Strasbourg 
plenary 4-7 May 2009 (the last plenary before the EP elections). Basically three issues were on the 
table: the opt-out clause, the definition of on-call time, and the  issue of multiple contracts. The 
opt-out  clause  remained  the  main  stumbling  block,  with  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  the 
European Parliament unable to reconcile their positions 
2.  It is relevant to point out the limitations of the analysis. Firstly, regarding the individual patterns 
of each country and particularly the anomalies in the southern group, a selection of ten Member 
States and four cases is clearly not enough to make valid generalisations and rule out case-specific 
tendencies.  Secondly,  one  of  the  reasons  for  why  the  northern  group  ranked  as  an  important 
partner among all the three groups could be found in the fact that all the four Presidencies leading 
the discussions in the four cases happened to be among the northern group. Evidently, the patterns 
of the three groups mirrored too much country- and case-specific tendencies to be taken as valid 
proof.  Therefore,  in  future  research  more  countries  and  possibly  also  more  cases  should  be 
included in the data-set in order to make plausible claims about the overall coalition pattern. This 
research has nevertheless managed to demonstrate the patterns of four distinct cases, shedding 
some light on the cooperation patterns in the field of research, social, transport policy and internal 
market issues. 
3.  In the period of 2002-2009, the following countries have held the presidency (in chronological 
order): Spain, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Irish Republic, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom, Austria, Finland, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, France, Czech Republic, Sweden. 23 
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